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Abstract
The Minority Game is a simple yet highly non-trivial agent-based model
for a complex adaptive system. Despite its importance, a quantitative ex-
planation of the game’s fluctuations which applies over the entire parameter
range of interest has so far been lacking. We provide such a quantitative
description based on the interplay between crowds of like-minded agents and
their anti-correlated partners (anticrowds).
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Agent-based models of complex adaptive systems are attracting significant interest across
a variety of disciplines [1]. An important application currently receiving much attention
within the physics community, is the study of fluctuations in financial markets [2]. Each
agent knows the past ups and downs in the price index of a financial market and must decide
how to trade based on this global information. These decisions then feed back to generate
the fluctuations or ‘volatility’ of the price index itself. The resulting dynamical, many-body
system is hence highly non-linear; indeed the combination of adaptability and frustration
make such agent-based systems arguably richer and more challenging than those typically
studied in condensed matter and statistical physics.
The Minority Game (MG) introduced by Challet and Zhang [3,4], offers possibly the
simplest paradigm for such a complex, adaptive system. The development of a complete,
quantitative theory of the MG is of fundamental importance - the MG has therefore been the
subject of intense research activity in the physics community [2–10]. The most striking fea-
ture arising from numerical simulations [4] is the non-monotonic variation in the ‘volatility’
σ (i.e. the standard deviation of the fluctuations) of the ‘price’ as the agents’ memory-length
m is varied. Challet et al provided a sophisticated formal connection between the MG and
spin glass systems [5] yielding many fascinating quantitative results for the MG’s dynamics.
However, no general theory has yet been provided which yields quantitative agreement with
the numerical results for σ [4] over the entire range of m, s and N values.
This paper shows that a theoretical model can be constructed in a surprisingly simple way
by incorporating the ‘crowd’ effects (i.e. strong inter-agent correlations) which arise within
the interacting, many-agent population. The results yield very good agreement with the
numerical results for σ over the entire range of m, s and N . The non-monotonic behaviour
of the volatility σ [3,4] results from a fascinating interplay between the actions of groups of
like-minded agents (‘crowds’) and the actions of opposing groups (‘anticrowds’).
The MG [3] comprises an odd number of agents N who choose repeatedly between option
0 (e.g. buy) and option 1 (e.g. sell). The winners are those in the minority group, e.g. sellers
win if there is an excess of buyers. The outcome at each timestep represents the winning
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decision, 0 or 1. A common bit-string of the m most recent outcomes is made available
to the agents at each timestep. The agents randomly pick s strategies at the beginning of
the game, with repetitions allowed. After each turn, the agent assigns one (virtual) point
to each of his strategies which would have predicted the correct outcome. At each turn of
the game, the agent uses the most successful strategy, i.e. the one with the most virtual
points, among his s strategies. The strategy-space Vm forms a 2m-dimensional hypercube
with strategies at the 22
m
vertices. Fortunately, the MG’s standard deviation is essentially
unchanged if a ‘reduced’ strategy space Um is used instead of Vm [3]: the Um only contains
2m+1 strategies or equivalently 2m strategy pairs {G}. The two strategies within a given
pair G are anticorrelated, i.e. they differ by the maximum possible Hamming distance
dH = 2
m [3]. Strategies between any two pairs G and G ′ are uncorrelated, i.e. they differ by
dH = 2
m−1. The results presented in this paper employ the reduced strategy space.
If nR agents use the same strategy R, then they will act as a ‘crowd’, i.e. they will make
the same decision. If nR¯ agents simultaneously use the anticorrelated strategy R¯, they will
make the opposite decision and will hence act as an ‘anticrowd’ (G ≡ (R, R¯)). If nR ≈ nR¯
for all G, then the actions of the crowds and anticrowds cancel and the standard deviation σ
of the number of agents A(t) choosing a given option will be small. In contrast if nR ≫ nR¯
for all G, then σ will be large. Since there is no correlation between G and G ′, each group
G comprising a crowd-anticrowd pair (nR, nR¯) can be taken as contributing to A(t) via a
separate, essentially random walk in time of step-size |nR − nR¯|. The variances of these
walks can be summed to obtain the standard deviation of A(t). Hence the MG standard
deviation is given by
σ =
[ 2m∑
G=1
σ2G
] 1
2
=
[ ∑
G≡(R,R¯)
1
4
|nR − nR¯|2
] 1
2
(1)
where both time-averaging, for a given configuration of initial strategies, and configuration-
averaging have been carried out. We now demonstrate that this crowd-anticrowd cancella-
tion underlies the numerical results for σ vs. m [4]. We run the numerical simulation of
the MG and wait until transients in A(t) have disappeared. At timestep t0, we read out the
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number of players playing each strategy R, where R = 1, 2, . . . 2m+1. For each strategy pair
G = (R, R¯), we obtain nR − nR¯ at time t0 and hence calculate σ. We then average this σ
over 1000 timesteps to simulate the time-averaging (our results are insensitive to the precise
time-averaging procedure). Finally, we average over 16 runs to simulate the configuration-
averaging. Figure 1 compares the resulting time and configuration-averaged σ with that
obtained from the numerical MG simulation. The agreement is very good for all m, s and N
(not shown). Hence the crowd-anticrowd cancellation quantitatively explains the numerical
results for σ [4].
Since the labels R are arbitrary in Eq. (1), the ordering of strategies {nR} has no
particular significance. At any particular time t0, these 2
m+1 strategies can be ranked
according to their virtual points by a sort-operation Θ acting on the list {nR}. Hence {nR} Θ7→
{nρ} where ρ is the virtual-point rank label with ρ = 1 being the highest scoring strategy
and {nρ} ≡ nρ=1, nρ=2, . . . nρ=2m+1 . Alternatively, strategies can be ranked according to
their popularity {nr} where {nr} ≡ nr=1, nr=2, . . . nr=2m+1 , i.e. strategy r = 1 is that used
by the largest number of agents, strategy r = 2 is that used by the second largest number of
agents, etc. Note that {nr} can be obtained from {nR} and hence {nρ} by sort operations,
i.e. {nR} Ψ7→ {nr} and hence {nρ} Γ7→ {nr}. Since each agent plays the available strategy
having highest virtual points, it follows that
nr = N
([
1− (r − 1)
2m+1
]s
−
[
1− r
2m+1
]s)
(2)
where
∑2m+1
r=1 nr = N as required. Agents are discrete objects; hence the simulation tends to
produce discrete steps in the curves of nr as a function of r, particularly for large m where
the total number of strategies 2m+1 exceeds N . Hence we convert the theoretical nr values
of Eq. (2) to an integer. For large m such that 2m+1 ≫ N , the resulting theoretical values
are typically nr ∼ 1 for small r and nr = 0 for r > N . We have checked that the theoretical
and numerical values for nr agree for general m.
For the virtual-point ordered list {nρ}, the strategy ρ′ = 2m+1 + 1− ρ is always anticor-
related to the strategy ρ, i.e. ρ′ ≡ ρ¯. Hence knowledge of the sort operation Γ completely
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determines where each strategy’s anticorrelated partner is located in the popularity-ordered
list {nr}. Since we are here only interested in time-averaged and run-averaged σ, we only
need to consider the probability distribution of locations of r¯ in the popularity-ordered list
{nr}. We therefore replace the sort operation Γ by a probability function P (r′ = r¯) which
gives the probability that any strategy r′ is the anti-correlated partner of strategy r in the
list {nr}. Hence Eq. (1) becomes
σ =
[
1
2
2m+1∑
r=1
2m+1∑
r′=1
1
4
|nr − nr′ |2P (r′ = r¯)
] 1
2
. (3)
When the virtual-point ordered list {nρ} and the popularity-ordered list {nr} are identical,
then P (r′ = r¯) will be a δ-function at r′ = 2m+1 + 1 − r and hence Eq. (3) has the same
form as Eq. (1). In the opposite case where the two ordered lists are uncorrelated, P (r′ = r¯)
should be a flat distribution.
Figure 2 shows P (r′ = r¯) for r = 1 as a function of r′, taken from the numerical MG
simulation at m = 2, 5 and 10. For small m (m = 2) the anticorrelated strategy to the most
popular strategy (i.e. r = 1) is at r′ = 2m+1, i.e. it is the least popular strategy. Hence
P (r′ = r¯) resembles the δ-function limiting case mentioned above. Very few agents will
therefore play this anticorrelated strategy. Hence the crowd-anticrowd cancellation will be
small and σ will be large, as can be seen in Fig. 1. As m increases (m = 5) a remarkable
effect occurs: the peak in P (r′ = r¯) moves up toward r = 1. Hence both r = 1 and its
anticorrelated partner r¯ are now very popular. Form = 2 it seemed like there was an effective
‘repulsion’ between r and r¯; for m = 5 this seems more like an attraction yielding a bound
‘exciton-like’ pair with the crowd (anticrowd) playing the role of the positive (negative)
charge. For large m (m = 10), the ability of the anticrowd to ‘screen’ the crowd has
decreased yielding a rather flat distribution. The strong crowd-anticrowd correlation which
appears as m increases means that the crowd and anticrowd become comparable in size.
Hence σ is small for m ∼ 5 − 6, in agreement with Fig. 1. Note that the MG cannot fully
‘optimize’ itself by building equal-sized crowds and anticrowds because of the strategy-space
frustration built in at the beginning of the game. In modified MG models such as Ref. [11]
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which features evolving stochastic strategies, this frustration is able to relax - similar sized
crowds and anti-crowds hence emerge yielding a smaller-than-random σ for general m.
For small m, the two lists {nρ} and {nr} will be very similar, hence P (r′ = r¯) ∼
δr′,2m+1+1−r. The discreteness of the agents is now unimportant since nr ≫ 1, hence nr can
be treated as continuous. Equations (2) and (3) yield
σlow m =
N
2
[ 2m∑
r=1
[(
1− r − 1
2m+1
)s
−
(
1− r
2m+1
)s
−
(
r
2m+1
)s
+
(
r
2m+1
)s(
1− 1
r
)s]2 ] 1
2
. (4)
For s = 2 this becomes
σlow m =
N√
3 2
m
2
+1
[
1− 2−2(m+1)
] 1
2
. (5)
The inset in Fig. 3 shows these analytic curves for s = 2 and s = 4 (thick solid lines
monotonically decreasing). As might be expected using the extreme δ-function form for
P (r′ = r¯), these curves produce upper estimates of σ for small m. Now consider the opposite
extreme of uncorrelated r′ and r¯, i.e. the flat distribution P (r′ = r¯) ∼ 2−(m+1). For s = 2
this gives
σlow m =
N√
3 2
(m+3)
2
[
1− 2−2(m+1)
] 1
2
. (6)
Equation (6), and its generalization for s > 2, produce lower estimates (thin dashed lines
in Fig. 3 inset). For a given s, the σ values obtained from separate numerical runs tend to
be scattered between the two corresponding limiting analytic curves. For larger m (m > 6)
the discreteness of the agents implies that nr ∼ 1 for r < N while nr = 0 for r > N . Using
the integer form of Eq. (2) for high m, and the flat distribution for P (r′ = r¯), yields
σhigh m =
√
N
2
[
1− N
2m+1
] 1
2
. (7)
Hence σ approaches the coin-toss limit from below asm→∞ (thick solid line monotonically
increasing in Fig. 3 inset) as observed numerically. The analytic curves in Fig. 3 (inset)
have further similarities with the numerical results of Fig. 1: (a) a minimum in σ for
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s = 2, (b) minimum moves to higher m as s increases, (c) minimum becomes shallower as s
increases, (d) σ is not sensitive to s for large m. Equation (7) also shows that σhigh m → 0
at N = 2m+1, i.e. for m ∼ 5− 6. Using conditional probabilities to go one step beyond the
approximation of a flat P (r′ = r¯) distribution, we find that σhigh m for general s is given by
√
N [1 − 2−(m+1)(Ns − 1)] 12/2. Interestingly, this form is consistent with the results of the
spin-glass replica approach [12,13].
Figure 3 (main graph) shows the spread of numerical values for different runs compared
to the full crowd-anticrowd theoretical calculation. The appropriate analytic expressions for
the probability function P (r′ = r¯) in Eq. (3) involve multiple sums and are cumbersome: we
therefore obtained the results for each m in Fig. 3 by generating the corresponding P (r′ = r¯)
similar to those in Fig. 2. The agreement is very good. The theoretical points tend to lie
toward the high end of the numerical spread, for example at m = 2; this can be attributed
to the fact that our theory neglects accidental degeneracies in the virtual-point ordered list
{nρ}. We have checked that including a stochastic (i.e. coin-toss) process to break such ties,
reduces the theoretical σ values down toward the mid-point of the numerical spread hence
making the agreement even better [13].
In summary we have presented an analytic analysis of crowding effects in the MG which
provides quantitative agreement with the main finding of Ref. [4] across the entire parameter
range of interest.
We thank D. Challet for his comments.
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FIGURES
FIG. 1. Standard deviation σ for the Minority Game as a function of memory-size m for
s = 2, 3, 4 strategies per agent and N = 101 agents. Solid curve: numerical simulation. Dashed
curve: crowd-anticrowd theory using Eq. (1). Random (coin-toss) limit σ =
√
N/2 = 5.0 is
indicated.
FIG. 2. Probability function P (r′ = r¯) giving the probability that the strategy ranked r′ on
the popularity-ordered list, is anti-correlated with the strategy ranked r. Results are shown for
r = 1 (i.e. most popular strategy) as a function of r′ for m = 2 (dotted-dashed), m = 5 (dotted)
and m = 10 (solid). s = 2 and N = 101. Note that
∑
r′ P (r
′ = r¯) = 1.
FIG. 3. Theoretical crowd-anticrowd calculation (solid circles) vs. numerical simulations (open
circles) for s = 2, N = 101. 16 numerical runs are shown for each m. Inset: Theoretical curves for
σ using limiting analytic forms in Eqs. (4)-(7).
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